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Over the course of the years, the Mediterranean region has been analysed from many different 
perspectives and defined on the basis of the specific approach followed at the time (i.e. historic-
cultural political, economical, functional etc.). On this occasion I would like to avoid ulterior 
interpretations and focus attention above all on the need for a course of development to guarantee 
security in Southern Europe. 
Considering that the geographic centrality and the complexity of the Mediterranean area - ethnic 
and religious differences, differences in development, differences in lifestyles and forms of 
government etc., proper to these countries - are, at one and the same time, points of strength and 
elements of weakness, it is easy to understand, on the one hand, the considerable interest from an 
international point of view for this issue and, on the other, the difficulties met with when wanting to 
organise some kind of integrated policy and the management on a rational scale of the resources in 
an imperative perspective of “sustainability”. 
If we take a look at the European continent, marked differences can be detected between the various 
boundary areas that pass from the Northern to the Western zones - free from potential destabilising 
and risk factors - to those of the East and of the South, where the European Union has to deal with 
two specific “crisis areas”. Despite the post-war commitment and efforts made (starting from the 
end of the Cold War and continuing up to the present day) to avoid the construction of a new wall 
of division in the Mediterranean Region but rather, to emphasise the concept that the Mediterranean 
region should itself represent a source of dynamism and an area of free exchange (objective fixed 
for the year 2010), at the present time, the Mediterranean is still considered one of the neuralgic 
points of international crises and, consequently, peace in the world is closely connected with the 
Region’s stability. On the other hand, the process begun in Barcellona in 1995, despite attempts in 
terms of conferring new dynamism, does not include any substantial success and the progress in 
macro-economic terms, achieved up to now is still insufficient and far from being consolidated. 
Furthermore, the numerous plans and programmes proposed and supported by governing 
Commissions and by International Institutions have achieved very limited results, because the 
Mediterranean continues to be considered a state of affairs and not a project. Central-Northern 
Europe, besides, appears much more interested in opening up towards the East rather than towards 
the South, unveiling the risk of a decline in marginal development. The very regions that should 
cement, in terms of a “linking area” the Mediterranean and the Rhine seem more inclined to have 
the South become one of their influence areas which is tantamount to keeping the area in a 
condition of dependency.  
We cannot get away from the fact! With no specific political initiatives – and the European Union is 
still in search of autonomous capacity to produce political initiatives - no partnership initiative 
scheme can take off, not even in economic-commercial terms. It will not be possible to achieve the 
heralded globalisation of European policy for the Mediterranean, simply by dealing on the whole 
with bilateral relations (from which relations a group of vertical compartments of the entire region 
derive). The existence of a “dialogue” at the end of which each party remains firmly wedged within 
his own ways of existence and anchored to his convictions is no longer sufficient.  
Finally, the time has passed for “reforms”, which pre-suppose the existence of institutions to 
safeguard. We must now pass on to the phase of “transformation”. The least we can ask of the 
European Union if it really intends to give an effective signal towards the Mediterranean, is to start 
implementing policies of concerted development and of North-South co-operation in order that with 
its contribution, the difficulties that many countries of the South are facing – on a social and  
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economic plane – can be overcome and the conditions that impede the flow of foreign investments 
removed. Only by means of a strong and lasting political initiative whose outcome can be none 
other than the constitution of a Euro-Mediterranean area with common operative Institutions 
provided with a long-term strategic vision, can the Mediterranean abandon its position of weakness 
and of dependency. 
I don’t want to suggest that Europe should take on the role of a top power, but rather, that Europe 
can aspire to leadership, in a certain sense, considering that capitalist globalisation has in the 
meantime become consolidated and that space for independent strategies that are not those of the 
management of well constituted interests, has been removed.  
It has been opportune and right to concentrate on the East of Europe over the last ten years, but on 
the twenty first century’s agenda of security and development we should not underestimate the 
relevance of the Mediterranean. During the Cold War the Mediterranean represented the vital line 
of communication through which raw materials and energy passed towards the West and is today is 
the crucial Southern flank of the NATO, as well as the border region of the European Union. 
As far as Italy is concerned, a strategy of leadership would not be implemented for ideological or 
ecumenical reasons, but rather, by natural vocation. Consequently, interest for the Mediterranean 
area could become pre-eminent again not so much as regards the areas in the centre of the European 
Union but rather in those that today constitute the borders.  
Regional governments, in order to escape their subordinate status compared to national 
governments, could start to look for roles and geopolitical strategies that emphasise and highlight 
the Southern Italy-Mediterranean relationship, benefiting from advantages of geographical vicinity 
and productive affinity in the same way that the Northern regions of Italy have benefited from 
Western and Central Europe.  
This does not mean a new way of division from Europe, but on the contrary, returning to the fold 
with political proposals and a different and more functional economic vision in the face of the needs 
of millions of people who have decided to live and work in the Mediterranean area. Except for some 
scenarios, as for example, in Campania, where in recent years worthy initiatives have been achieved 
in this direction, it would seem that the governing classes – perhaps for fear of “falling into the 
Mediterranean” - prefer to maintain Southern Italy in a sort of economic and cultural limbo 
deprived of ties with the North and unable to create an independent strategy of development in the 
direction of the South, where on the contrary, their Italian and European vocation should push. 
Imagine for example, the advantages which would derive from the growth of markets; migratory 
pressure would be reduced on the European Union, environmental risks would be reduced, risks of 
political destabilisation and military aggression would be reduced and last but not least, a balanced 
process of growth in Southern Europe would be re-charged. 
Europe now finds itself at a crossroads: whether to consider with renewed vigour initiatives for the 
stability of the Mediterranean region or resign herself to undergoing the consequences of ever 
stronger destabilizing factors. If the first option is chosen, Italy too must continue to be committed 
to the purpose, last year during the semester of the Italian Presidency of the European Union (the 
last Mediterranean Presidency until the deadline of 2010) the President outlined progress made in 
this direction. For the next opportunity it will be necessary to wait at least until 2015 and it is not 
easy to imagine what scenario will present itself then. So, we should act now, in order to play an 
active role as stakeholders in the development and security of Southern Europe and in the whole of 
the Mediterranean area.   
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We should promote political actions for the key actors of European and International Institutions 
and attempt a process of restructuring the negative perception of the area, by means of the 
construction of an integrated and aggregated structural and dynamic information system. 
Had the Mediterranean dialogue not been invented, we would have had to create it. Today, on the 
contrary, we have the opportunity to reap the rewards of existing co-operation and to carry on 
adapting this co-operation to meet the new challenges on the horizon. Multilateralism represents the 
most remunerative political investment on the international scene, in the light of the resolution of 
regional crises and the construction of world governance,  structured on the role of the United 
Nations, which must absolutely be re-confirmed. Multilateral relations are probably the most 
laborious, but they ensure without doubt the greatest efficacy for foreign policy and develop a sense 
of responsibility on the part of the interlocutors towards one another. A different logic would be 
totally inadequate for managing the complexity of the modern world. Transatlantic solidarity 
constitutes a fundamental piece of this mosaic. As Europeans, we are aware of having benefited 
from and enjoyed fifty years of peace – despite the tensions of the Cold War era – thanks to and 
because of, the Atlantic Alliance. In fact, political and military alliances often offer a valid 
contribution to lasting peace.  
This is why NATO’s role must not be relegated to the history of the twentieth century, but rather to 
the issues of the twenty first century, in all their urgency. It is possible to speculate that more 
intense co-operation between NATO countries and Mediterranean countries would favour the 
reinstating of the peace process and above all, the re-establishing of fundamental reciprocal trust. 
In particular, it is necessary to launch a strong and clear signal to the countries of the Mediterranean 
area at a time in which the Atlantic Alliance is pursuing its enlargement policy towards East, in 
order to bring to mind that, in the project fostered by the NATO and the European Union to create a 
Great Region of Europe, the Mediterranean has always been an integral part and will not be 
relegated to the traditional framework of the dual relationship North-South, i.e. developed countries 
and those in process of development. There should be awareness of the Mediterranean in its global 
capacity the components of which share a common destiny including that of security. 
Globalisation, which is not just limited to the economic sphere, but invests social, cultural issues 
etc. is a policy that can in theory, be judged as right or mistaken. It is a process destined to gain 
ground, offering opportunities of exchange, of inter-relations, of technological acquisition and of 
growth, quite unimaginable for those peoples and nations at the margins of development, and who 
must be governed by recognised supra-national Institutions and regulated by means of established 
and accepted rules.  
The passage from a bi-polar system to that of a post-bi-polar system produced hopes and illusions 
which rapidly vanished however, when it was realised that the risks and challenges far from 
disappearing, increased dramatically, not least as the result of the processes of political fragmenting. 
It is clear that it was the latter that produced and generated greater systemic instability on a regional 
level, but it is also those integrative systems and above all those that are concentrated into the 
concept of globalisation that highlighted the fact that problems of security are not completely 
manageable on a national scale. The concept of security, traditionally seen from a purely military 
perspective, has gradually grown to embrace economic aspects, political-cultural aspects as well as 
others of a different nature. To guarantee security, then, means not so much or at least, not only, to 
increase the weight of traditional power factors but rather to reduce to a minimum the conditions of  
specific vulnerability.  
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Functional to this aim would be an accurate analysis prior to implementing actions that could avoid 
an extremely critical and dangerous union of forces. A return to the study then of the problems that 
encourage the phenomena, their dimension and collocation in space, the inter-dependence between 
possible solutions and the choice of development made by European countries appears to be the 
longest and most laborious way but also the only one possible. An analysis of the present day 
economic and political questions in the Mediterranean region must not neglect, furthermore, the 
considerable imbalances existing in the region concerning population and uses of the resources.  
In this operative framework, the role of territorial planning is strategic. In establishing economic 
and social objectives for late developing countries, territorial planning ensures a rational use of 
resources and productive structures, so as to promote growth according to the canons of 
sustainability. Even so, prediction, planning and programming are processes that seem to have been 
totally underestimated by the various supra-national key actors who for different reasons, are called 
upon to take care of the development and security in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean area. 
In fact, an attentive observer might ask how individual Institutions could possibly offer a valid 
contribution towards attaining the so called unified objectives in the absence of a strategic 
framework, that establishes the guide lines for the development of that area and which is imperative 
for guaranteeing the complementary function of the actions of the various Institutions. 
Only after indicating the principal lines of development can one follow up with the formulation of 
projects that are well inserted into a strategic framework, so as to seal the gap existing between 
plans, programmes, actions, laws and recommendations. Besides, if the risks are connected with an 
ever more unbalanced world situation, we will be obliged to visualise a global strategy of 
development.  
Economic processes alone do not seem able to produce lasting balance, above all in the epoch of 
global competition, which very often, is nourished on instability itself and on the continuing 
producing of differences. However, if the objective is that of development, perhaps more gradual 
but more widespread development, we would need to formulate a corpus of rules, and consolidate 
an order founded on values which are not just of an economic nature. The task of elaborating new 
instruments that guarantee a strategy of “correct development” cannot but be entrusted to the 
political sphere. 
The difficulties encountered in the attempt to correctly re-compose the “Mediterranean mosaic” are 
many, but not much greater than those that other regions have had to face at the beginning of the re-
construction of their economic, political and cultural identity. Most of the countries in the 
Mediterranean Basin, even those on the Northern shore, are today areas of territorial depression and 
of political destabilisation even because Europe, in order to enter into competition in a “tri-global” 
sense has indicated certain geographical areas, emarginating others and subordinating the 
satisfaction of needs to those of richer countries and markets. But now at last it is clear to them that 
the four fundamental challenges of present day development (technology, ecology, demography and 
institutions) cannot be dealt with without the rediscovery and the enhancement of the Mediterranean 
regional dimension. 
For the countries of the Mediterranean, therefore, there is no other alternative, and for the European 
countries the alternative remains that of the “wall”; a project not only immoral but also unfeasible 
because as history has demonstrated, divisions never support the drive of men. 
From these considerations which emerged during the course of my studies and research, the idea of 
elaborating a “MASTER PLAN FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA”, gradually took shape, integrating 
the idea of a “Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean” launched by the Berlusconi Government, in  
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which the roles of the individual territories, the duties of the institutional subjects and the actions to 
undertake in a co-ordinated way, in the light of (a) a new international order and (b) the disparity 
and the different directions of the forces in the field. I am well aware that this process is not simple 
nor is it short term, because it requires, besides an adequate support of knowledge, analysis and 
proposals on the part of intellectuals, lucid awareness and a patient line of action on the part of 
governments, their powers of planning, control and intervention. However, in my view, it is 
possible to create the preliminary conditions for favouring and facilitating the process, by instituting 
a Task Force of international experts who, on the one hand, are able to provide accurate knowledge 
both of the key actors and of the global and regional dynamics, and on the other, have the right 
command of theoretical and methodological instruments for the analysis of trends and solutions for 
current problems, in order to set up a strategic project for development and security in Southern 
Europe and the Mediterranean area.  
I am certain that this Workshop will provide useful and preliminary reflections for succeeding in 
this objective. 